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Cooperative behaviors are defined as the production of common goods benefitting all members
of the community at the producer’s cost. They could seem to be in contradiction with natural
selection, as non-cooperators have an increased fitness compared to cooperators. Understanding the
emergence of cooperation has necessitated the development of concepts and models (inclusive fitness,
multilevel selection, ...) attributing deterministic advantages to this behavior. In contrast to these
models, we show here that cooperative behaviors can emerge by taking into account the stochastic
nature of evolutionary dynamics : when cooperative behaviors increase the carrying capacity of
the habitat, they also increase the genetic drift against non-cooperators. Using the Wright-Fisher
models of population genetics, we compute exactly this increased genetic drift and its consequences
on the fixation probability of both types of individuals. This computation leads to a simple criterion:
cooperative behavior dominates when the relative increase in carrying capacity of the habitat caused
by cooperators is higher than the selection pressure against them. This is a purely stochastic effect
with no deterministic interpretation.
I. INTRODUCTION.
Cooperative behaviors can be defined as the produc-
tion a common good by an individual that benefits ev-
erybody in the community. Such behavior has a cost
in terms of fitness, as the producer devotes part of its
resources to this task. To early evolutionary biologists,
cooperative behaviors seemed to be in contradiction with
natural selection[1, 2]: since selection acts on individu-
als, a non-cooperator has a higher fitness than a coop-
erator and will always invade the community. Coopera-
tive behaviors however, specially in microbial world, are
widespread. A few examples of such behaviors are light
production in Vibrio fisheri [3], siderophore production in
Pseudomonas aeroguinosa[4, 5], stalk formation by Dic-
tyostelium discoidum[6, 7], decreased virulence in many
pathogen-host systems[8]. All these cases are examples
of a production of common good by an individual benefit-
ing every individual in the community. More generally,
these behaviors can be seen as particular cases of Niche
Construction[9].
Researchers have investigated the deterministic ad-
vantages that these kinds of behaviors could confer on
individuals. The major schools along this line of in-
vestigation are inclusive fitness[10–12] and multilevel
selection[13–16] and their associated variants[17], al-
though the relative merits of these concepts are some-
times hotly debated[18, 19]. The aim of this article is
not to discuss the relevance of these models, which have
been documented in a large number of books and articles.
The fact that cooperative behaviors are so widespread,
however, behooves us to search for simple mechanisms to
explain their emergence. I intend in this article to show
that cooperative behaviors, by the simple act of increas-
ing the carrying capacity of the habitat, give an advan-
tage to cooperators. The origin of this advantage is not
deterministic, but has to be sought in the stochasticity
of evolutionary dynamics.
Evolution is an interplay between deterministic causes
broadly called fitness, and random events such as sam-
pling between generations. An advantageous mutant
does not spread with certainty but has only a greater
probability of invading the community and of being fixed.
This probability, called the fixation probability, is the rel-
evant quantity to weight deterministic versus stochastic
causes[20].
Consider an asexual population of fixed size N , with
two types of individuals A and S, where S types have a
constant excess relative fitness s compared to A. the de-
terministic differential equation describing the variation
of the proportion x = NA/N of the A type is[21]:
dx/dt = −sx(1− x) (1)
and leads to the disappearance of A individuals (x→ 0).
Going beyond the deterministic approach, one can
solve the full stochastic dynamics of such a model and
extract the invasion capacity of these two types, i.e. the
fixation probability πi1 of one individual of type i intro-
duced into a population consisting entirely of the other
type. In the framework of the Wright-Fisher or Moran
model of population genetics, for a population of fixed
size N , in the small selection pressure limit Ns≪ 1:
πA1 =
1
N
− s (2)
πS1 =
1
N
+ s (3)
Therefore, if s > 0 then πS1 > π
A
1 and type S individuals
have a higher invasion capacity than type A individuals.
In this case, the ratio of invasion capacities has the same
information content as the deterministic approach: both
lead to the conclusion that s > 0 favors the S type. This
broad equivalence between these two approaches has led
researchers to investigate the existence of deterministic
advantages that could favor the cooperators (A individu-
als) against non-cooperators (S individuals) even though
2Figure 1: Scheme of a cooperative behavior where the car-
rying capacity N of the habitat is an increasing function of
the proportion x of type A individuals : N = N(x). For a
habitat formed of only S type individuals, N(0) = Ni. When
only A individuals are present, N(1) = Nf , where Nf > Ni.
The invasion capacity of each type is defined as the fixation
probability of one i type introduced into a community formed
only of type j.
s, the bare fitness of S (or equivalently, the cost of altru-
ism to A) is positive.
Fluctuations and random events can however be more
subtle and alter the equivalence between deterministic
and stochastic modeling. In particular, we can have
πS1 < π
A
1 even when s > 0, without any hidden deter-
ministic advantage. This is the case of a cooperative be-
havior that increases the carrying capacity of the habitat.
Consider a system where the carrying capacity is a func-
tion of the proportion of cooperators, varying betweenNi
when only S type is present and Nf where only A type
is present, with Ni < Nf (figure 1). We suppose that
S types have a constant excess relative fitness s > 0.
The deterministic equation (1) does not change and will
again lead to the A’s extinction. In contrast to the de-
terministic computation however, a back of the envelope
estimation of the invasion capacity of both types yields:
πA1 =
1
Ni
− s (4)
πS1 =
1
Nf
+ s (5)
We observe that we can have πS1 < π
A
1 even though s > 0,
if
2s <
1
Ni
− 1
Nf
or equivalently, on setting N¯ =
√
NiNf , if 2N¯s <
∆N/N¯ : if the selection pressure against cooperators is
smaller than the relative variation in the carrying capac-
ity due to cooperators, then the latter type is favored and
has a higher invasion capacity. This is a purely stochas-
tic effect with no deterministic counterpart and is due
to the fact that cooperators increase the genetic drift of
non-cooperators.
We had previously shown the existence of this effect us-
ing a two dimensional Markov chain approach of a gen-
eralized Moran model[22]. This approach however was
mathematically intricate and only approximate solutions
could be obtained at small selection pressure. The ef-
fect however can be understood in a much simpler way
using a classical Wright-Fisher (WF) model of popula-
tion genetics, which I develop in the following sections,
where very general results can be obtained. The WF
model is a well studied generic model of population ge-
netics, shown to be equivalent to many other models of
population genetics[23].
The article is organized as follow. In the result sec-
tion, the first subsection is devoted to recalling the main
results of the classical WF model. In the second subsec-
tion, a simple system is considered where the carrying
capacity is a linear function of the proportion of coop-
erators. An exact solution for the fixation probabilities
is then obtained and it is shown that cooperators can
have a higher invasion capacities than non-cooperators,
even when the cost of cooperation is always positive. The
third subsection generalizes this concept to arbitrary de-
pendence of the carrying capacity on the proportion of
cooperators; a very simple and general criterion is then
obtained for cooperators to prevail. Finally, the exten-
sion to diploid populations is considered in the following
subsection. The conclusion section put these results into
perspective in respect to other models of the emergence
of cooperation.
II. RESULTS.
A. Preliminaries.
I recall the main results of the classical Wright-Fisher
model for the sake of clarity of the following sections. In
a community of fixed size N , two types of asexual adult
individuals A and S of abundance nA and nS (nA+nS =
N) produce progeny. This progeny is then sampled to
form the next generation of adults. The sampling process
is biased toward the S type which has an excess relative
fitness s which we suppose to be small (0 < s≪ 1).
The transition probability to have k individuals of type
A in the next generation Gi+1 when nA individuals were
present at generation Gi is binomial [21, 24]:
P (k|nA) =
(
N
k
)
uk(1− u)N−k
where
u =
x
x+ (1 + s)(1− x) (6)
= x− sx(1 − x) +O(s2) (7)
In the above expression, x = nA/N designates the pro-
portion of A in Gi. The bias s toward the selection of
one type can be due to the increase in mean number of
progeny, the variability in their production[23, 25], or any
other similar phenomena.
3The exact dynamics of the above stochastic process is
not known, but one can resort to the diffusion approxi-
mation [21, 26] to compute various quantities of interest.
This computation is based on the change in the mean
and variance of the proportion of A types in the next
generation, which, to the first order in s is:
a(x) = 〈y|x〉 − x = −sx(1− x) (8)
b(x) =
1
2
Var(y|x) = 1
2N
x(1− x) (9)
where y is the proportion of A in the next generation;
〈y|x〉 designates the expectation of y conditioned on x,
the proportion of A in the present generation. The
fixation probability π(x) of the A type present with
proportion x at the first generation can be computed
from the backward diffusion approximation of stochas-
tic dynamics[26] :
a(x)
dπ(x)
dx
+ b(x)
d2π(x)
dx2
= 0 (10)
As −a(x)/b(x) = 2Ns, the use of boundary conditions
π(0) = 0, π(1) = 1 leads to the well known Kimura
solution:
π(x) =
1− e2Nsx
1− e2Ns (11)
≈ x−Nsx(1 − x) for Ns≪ 1 (12)
The invasion capacity of both types are readily obtained
from the above expression
πA1 = π(1/N) ; π
S
1 = 1− π(1 − 1/N)
and are equal to expressions (2,3) in the small selection
pressure limit Ns ≪ 1. The ratio of invasion capacities
reads
RSA =
πS1
πA1
=
1 +Ns
1−Ns ≈ 1 + 2Ns (13)
and RSA > 1 if s > 0. Note that here we use s as the
relative excess advantage of the S type, or equivalently,
the cost of A type. Hence the change in the sign of s in
expression (11) compared to similar expressions used in
the literature. The reason behind this choice is that in
the following, A will designates the cooperators with a
positive cost for cooperation.
B. Variable size population.
Consider now a system in which the carrying capacity
is not constant, but is an increasing function of the num-
ber of cooperators nA(figure 1). The stochastic behavior
of such a system can be modelled as follow: as in the fixed
size habitat before, both A and S types at generation Gi
produce progeny ; however, the carrying capacity Ni+1
Figure 2: Scheme of sampling between generations in the
present model : The carrying capacity Ni+1 of generation
Gi+1 is a function of the number of cooperators nA,i present
at generation Gi : Ni+1 = N(nA). The selection process con-
sists in selecting Ni+1 individuals among the progeny at Gi.
of the next generation Gi+1 depends on the number (or
proportion) of cooperators in Gi. Hence Ni+1 = N(nA,i)
individuals among the progeny are randomly selected to
form the next generation (figure 2). The probability of
having k individuals of type A in generation Gi+1, know-
ing that there were nA,i individuals at generation Gi is
binomial :
P (k|nA,i) =
(
Ni+1
k
)
uk(1− u)Ni+1−k (14)
where u has the same definition as in (6). We can repeat
all the arguments for the computation of relative change
in the mean and variance of the proportion x = nA/N of
A types, keeping in mind that the only difference in the
present model is that N = N(x) is no longer constant.
In particular, the fixation probabilities are given by the
same backward diffusion equation
a(x)
dπ(x)
dx
+ b(x)
d2π(x)
dx2
= 0 (15)
where this time,
−a(x)
b(x)
= 2sN(x)
For the sake of simplicity, in this subsection we suppose
a linear form for N(x) (figure 1):
N(x) = (1− x)Ni + xNf (16)
where Nf and Ni (Ni < Nf) are the carrying capacities
of the habitat when composed only of A types and S
type. The next subsection generalizes the computation
to arbitrary form of N(x). The differential equation (15)
can still be easily solved. Let us express Ni and Nf in
terms of their mean and relative difference
N¯ = (Nf +Ni)/2 (17)
2δ = (Nf −Ni)/N¯ (18)
Then, setting
ψ(x) = 2N¯sx (1− δ + δx)
4we have
dπ
dx
= C exp (ψ(x)) (19)
Integrating once more and taking into account the
boundary conditions πA(0) = 0, πA(1) = 1, the solution
can be written as
π(x) =
f(0)− f(x)
f(0)− f(1) (20)
where
f(x) =
e2N¯s((1−δ)x+δx
2)
√
2N¯sδ
D
(√
N¯s
2δ
(1− δ + 2δx)
)
and
D(z) = e−z
2
ˆ z
0
eu
2
du
is the Dawson function. In the case of small selection
pressure against A (N¯s ≪ 1) and small relative change
in the size of the habitat δ ≪ 1, expanding the fixation
probability (20) to the second order in N¯s and δ, we find
π(x) ≈ x−N¯sx(1−x)+ N¯s
3
(N¯s+δ)x(1−x)(1−2x). (21)
Note that this limit could have been obtained by direct
integration of the power series expansion of exp (ψ(x)) in
expression (19). Direct integration of power series allows
more complicated laws of carrying capacity N(x) to be
taken into account, when exact solutions are no longer
available.
Figure 3 shows the excellent agreement between nu-
merical simulations of the above stochastic process and
the theoretical predictions (eqs. 20,21).
Let us now consider the case where δ and N¯s are of
the same order and compute the invasion capacity of each
type by keeping only the first order terms :
πA1 = π
(
1
Ni
)
≈ 1
Ni
− N¯
Ni
s
πS1 = 1− π
(
1− 1
Nf
)
≈ 1
Nf
+
N¯
Nf
s
The ratio of invasion capacities now becomes:
RSA =
πS1
πA1
=
(
1− δ
1 + δ
)(
1 + N¯s
1− N¯s
)
(22)
≈ 1 + 2N¯s− 2δ (23)
We see that, contrary to the fixed population size case
(eq. 13), we can have RSA < 1 even when s > 0 ! The
criterion for cooperators to prevail is simply
δ > N¯s (24)
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Figure 3: Numerical computation of pi(x) and its compar-
ison with theoretical values for Ni = 90, Nf = 110 and
s = (1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100) × 10−4. The arrow indicates the
direction of increasing s. For each value of initial proportion
of A individuals x ∈ [0, 1], a random discrete path is generated
by determining the carrying capacity in the next generation
according to relation (16) and then sampling of the present
generation to constitute the next generation according to re-
lation (14); the process is stopped by the loss of either A or
S individuals. 108 such paths are generated to compute, for
each initial proportion x, its fixation probability pi(x). Sym-
bols : values obtained from numerical simulations ; solid lines
: theoretical values according to expression (20) ; dashed lines
: small selection pressure approximation (eq. 21).
Figure 4 shows the excellent agreement between RSA ob-
tained from numerical results and the theoretical predic-
tion (eq. 20). Note that for large δ, the criterion (24) un-
derestimates the advantage of A individuals, which can
prevail at a higher cost of cooperation. The general form
of the criterion is given in the next subsection
Let us stress again that the A type advantage is due
purely to the stochasticity of natural selection and has
no deterministic interpretation. It is due to the interplay
between genetic drift and deterministic effect. The de-
terministic equation, neglecting fluctuations, is as before
dx
dt
= a(x) = −sx(1− x)
and predicts the disappearance of A individuals that have
a negative relative excess fitness.
C. Solution for general form of N(x).
The conditions necessary for RSA < 1 can be obtained
for any form of N(x) without computing π(x) explicitly.
First, note that the first integral of the Kimura equation
(15) is
log
(
π′(x)
π′(0)
)
= −
ˆ x
0
a(u)
b(u)
du
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−0.03
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−0.075
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Figure 4: Logarithm of the ratio of invasion capacities RSA =
piS1 /pi
A
1 as a function of selection pressure N¯s for N¯ = 100
and increasing value of δ = 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 (a-f).
Symbols : fixation probability ratio obtained from numerical
simulations as detailed in figure 3; solid lines : theoretical
predictions of fixation probabilities obtained from eq. (20) ;
dashed lines : general solution given by relation (25).
= 2s
ˆ x
0
N(u)du
The invasion capacities can be expressed in terms of the
function π′(x) :
πA1 = π(1/Ni) = π
′(0)(1/Ni) +O(1/N2i )
πS1 = 1− π(1 − 1/Nf) = π′(1)(1/Nf) +O(1/N2f )
because of the boundary conditions π(0) = 0 and π(1) =
1. Therefore, to the first order in 1/N , the ratio of inva-
sion capacities is:
RSA =
πS1
πA1
=
π′(1)
π′(0)
Ni
Nf
and therefore
log (RSA) = 2s
ˆ 1
0
N(u)du+ log (Ni/Nf) (25)
The condition for A to prevail, RSA < 1, is then equiva-
lent to
2s
ˆ 1
0
N(u)du < log (Nf/Ni) (26)
For the simple case investigated in the preceding subsec-
tion, in which N(x) = N¯(1−δ+2δx) the left hand side of
relation (26) evaluates to 2N¯s and the criterion becomes
2N¯s < log
(
1 + δ
1− δ
)
which reduces to expression (24) for small δ. The accu-
racy of this criterion, for the case of linear N(x), is shown
in figure 4. The general criterion (26) is not limited to
small selection pressure or small variation in population
size. The condition N ≫ 1 is still necessary for the va-
lidity of the diffusion approximation[27].
D. Extension to diploid populations.
The above results can be generalized to diploid, ran-
domly mating populations when cooperative behavior is
caused by a single gene. Consider a diploid population
of size N corresponding to 2N gametes. The fitness of
(AA,AS, SS) individuals will be denoted (1, 1+ s(1/2−
ǫ), 1+ s) where s, as before is the relative fitness value of
the allele S and ǫ ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] is the dominance of allele
A ; ǫ = 0 corresponds to no dominance. As before, x will
designate the frequency of allele A. Following the argu-
ments of the previous section, we can write the number
of A allele in the next generation as
P (k|nA,i) =
(
2Ni+1
k
)
uk(1− u)2Ni+1−k
where [21]
u =
x2 + (1 + s(1/2− ǫ))x(1 − x)
x2 + 2(1 + s(1/2− ǫ))x(1 − x) + (1 + s)(1− x)2
= x− sx(1 − x)(1 + 2ǫ− 4ǫx) +O(s2)
For the carrying capacity, we will use a generalization of
relation (16) :
N2
N¯2
= (1− δ + 2δx)2 + 2ǫδx(1− x)
where N¯ and δ were defined in (17,18). This relation
reduces to (16) when ǫ = 0 and ensures that N = N¯ =
const when δ = 0.
Repeating the computations of the previous section in
the regime where N¯s ≪ 1 and δ ≪ 1, and keeping the
lowest order terms leads to
π(x) = x− 2N¯sx(1− x)
(
1 +
2ǫ
3
(1− 2x)
)
from which we can compute the ratio of invasion capaci-
ties RSA = π
S
1 /π
A
1 :
RSA =
(
1− δ
1 + δ
)(
1 + 2N¯s(1− 2ǫ/3)
1− 2N¯s(1 + 2ǫ/3)
)
≈ 1 + 4N¯s− 2δ
The simplest diploid case (random mating, no linkage
disequilibrium) is similar to the haploid case and the cri-
terion for cooperators to prevail does not change.
III. CONCLUSION.
The problem of the emergence of cooperative behav-
iors and “altruism” has been a conundrum in evolutionary
biology and has attracted a very large number of con-
tributions from different fields. We have shown in this
article that this conundrum may not exist at all, if we
6shift our attention from deterministic advantages to fluc-
tuation induced advantages. The original Wright-Fisher
model, developed in the 20’s, clarified the concepts of
stochasticity in population genetics and showed that a
mutant, even when deleterious, has some probability of
invading the community, i.e. πA1 > 0. We have, in this
article, extended this concept by showing that it is even
possible for the deleterious mutant to have a higher inva-
sion capacity than the wild type, i.e. πA1 > π
S
1 . This is
based on the fact that purely fluctuation induced advan-
tages can overcome the disadvantages and the cost of co-
operative behaviors if the relative increase in the carrying
capacity of the habitat induced by cooperators is higher
than the cost of altruism. This demonstration has been
achieved by the use of the generic Wright-Fisher model,
which captures in very simple terms the combined effects
of finite size populations and deterministic advantages.
All the existing models of cooperation
(kin/multilevel/reciprocity/...) have also been ex-
tended to finite populations in order to take into account
the importance of fluctuations. The important point
to stress is that in these models, there are always
deterministic advantages associated with cooperation.
In other terms, the deterministic drift term a(x) has
multiple zeros and thus the deterministic equation for
the proportion of A,
dx/dt = a(x)
has more than one stable point, one of which corresponds
to the dominance of A types. For example, the replica-
tor dynamics used in the context of evolutionary game
theories uses[28]
a(x) = x(1 − x) (Ax+B(1 − x))
and for A > 0, B < 0 and B/(B − A) ∈ [0, 1], the dy-
namics possesses two stable points x = 0 and x = 1.
Taking into account fluctuations and finite size popula-
tions then helps to explain how a single A mutant can
emerge and dominate the habitat[29]. The same kind
of arguments can be made for multilevel selection theo-
ries, where the deterministic models already explain the
possibility for the existence of cooperators[15] and then
the computation can be extended to take into account
fluctuations[30].
As we stressed above, in the model we present in this
article, there is no deterministic advantages associated
with cooperations and a(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. The
only driving force in the present model is provided by
fluctuations due to finite size populations. The key point,
which we have demonstrated in the preceding sections, is
that the invasion capacity πA1 of the cooperators can be
higher than the invasion capacity of defectors πS1 , even
when the cost of cooperation s is always positive and the
deterministic approach leads to the extinction of the A
types.
The aim of this article is not to contest the merits of
existing models such as kin or multilevel selection, which
have been investigated during the last forty years with
a large number of case studies. I propose an alternative
approach to the problem of cooperation, that is compli-
mentary to the existing models and which restores the
key ingredients of population genetics to this field.
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